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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the relationship between social interaction and household 
finances using data from the British Household Panel Survey. We explore how social interaction 
influences the probability of holding different types of unsecured debt and assets, as well as how 
social interaction influences the levels of unsecured debt, financial assets and net worth held. Our 
findings suggest that social interaction has a positive influence upon the types of financial assets held, 
which is particularly pronounced for the holding of stocks and shares. Social interaction is also found 
to influence the amount of financial assets held as well as the level of household net worth. In 
contrast, there appears to be no clear relationship between social interaction and the holding of 
unsecured debt, suggesting that social interaction has distinct effects across different parts of the 
household balance sheet. When we instrument the measure of social interaction, our results once 
again endorse the finding that social interaction impacts differently on debt and asset holding. 
Interestingly, in this case, our findings support an inverse association between debt and social 
interaction. 
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I. Introduction and Background 
There is a growing body of empirical literature analysing the implications of social capital 
and social interaction in the economy. For example, at the microeconomic level, there has 
been interest in the relationship between social interaction, social capital and socio-economic 
outcomes such as educational attainment and employment, see, for example, Glaeser et al. 
(2002) and Brown and Taylor (2009). Whilst at the macroeconomic level, the debate has 
focused on the relationship between social capital and economic growth (see, for example, 
Knack and Keefer, 1997, and Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Recent work has conjectured that 
social interaction and social capital might also influence financial and economic decision-
making at the individual or household level focusing on stock market participation.  
Such an effect on financial decision-making could potentially occur through word-of-
mouth or observational learning (e.g. Banerjee, 1992; Ellison and Fudenburg, 1995), i.e. 
operating via the diffusion of information relating to, for example, stock market opportunities 
or how to actually participate in the stock market (Hong et al., 2004). Such channels of 
learning are arguably particularly relevant in the context of financial assets which are 
relatively complicated to acquire, such as stocks and shares, in contrast to the relatively more 
straightforward action of, for example, opening a savings account. Thus, the decision to 
invest in financial assets, as well as the type of assets to invest in, may be influenced by the 
decisions of and advice from work colleagues, friends and family. For example, Hong et al. 
(2004) present evidence supporting a positive association between social interaction and 
stock market participation in the U.S. with ‘social’ investors characterised by a higher 
probability of stock market participation whilst controlling for key demographic and socio-
economic characteristics such as wealth and education. Furthermore, this relationship is 
found to be more pronounced for individuals who reside in communities characterised by 
higher stock market participation rates. The measures of social interaction relate to church 
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attendance and interaction with neighbours. Similarly, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) report 
a positive relationship between a household’s stock purchases and those made by neighbours. 
Brown et al. (2008) explore the influence of community effects in the form of ‘word of 
mouth’ communication on stock market participation. They establish a causal link between 
an individual’s decision to own stocks and the average stock market participation of the 
individual’s community. Moreover, the latter result is found to be stronger within more social 
communities, as measured by whether households are likely to be asked by neighbours for 
advice. In a similar vein, Guiso et al. (2008) explore the relationship between trust and stock 
market participation and find that less trusting individuals are less likely to purchase stocks. 
They argue that their model is consistent with that of Hong et al. (2004), since social 
individuals exhibit more ‘generalised trust’, i.e. the trust that an individual has about an 
unknown individual from a particular community. More recently, Christelis et al. (2010) find 
that socially active households are more likely to own shares. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the implications of social interaction for household 
financial decision-making from a wider perspective than just stock market participation. To 
be specific, we explore the relationship between social interaction and a range of financial 
assets varying from stocks and shares to savings. Given the heterogeneous nature of financial 
assets in terms of, for example, the associated financial risk and complexity, one might 
conjecture that the influence of social interaction may vary across the different types of 
assets. In addition, we explore the relationship between social interaction and household 
liabilities, namely unsecured debt. It is apparent that social interaction may potentially have 
implications for household debt: as argued by Georgarakos et al. (2010), more sociable 
households may be more likely to receive financial support from family or friends if faced 
with financial difficulties, with such households potentially being able to turn to such 
informal credit channels. Such possibilities were also noted by Putnam (2000), p.312, in his 
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comprehensive review of civic life and social capital in the U.S, who states that: “social 
networks may also provide emotional and financial support for individuals.”  
We aim therefore to redress the imbalance in the existing literature on household 
finances and social interaction by adopting a more holistic view of household finances rather 
than focusing on one particular aspect, such as stock market participation, which has been the 
primary focus of the existing literature. In addition, the existing literature has generally 
focused on stock market participation in the context of the US. To our knowledge, this is the 
first paper to explore the relationship between social interaction and household finances for 
the UK, which is surprising in the context of the changes in stock market participation and 
financial asset holding in the UK over the last three decades with, for example, the widely 
publicised privatisation of public utilities such as British Telecom (see, for example, Banks 
and Tanner, 2002). Finally, in contrast to the existing literature, which has generally focused 
on cross-section data, we exploit panel data which allows us to explore the dynamic aspect to 
household finances. To be specific, we firstly explore the relationship between social 
interaction and the types of debt and assets held. We then explore the relationship between 
social interaction and the amount of debt, assets and net worth held. We therefore conduct 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the relationship between social interaction and a wide 
range of aspects of household finances thereby furthering our understanding of the 
implications of social interaction for financial and economic outcomes. 
II. Data and Methodology 
Our empirical analysis is based on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a survey 
conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic Research comprising approximately 
10,000 annual individual interviews. For wave one, interviews were carried out during the 
autumn of 1991. The same households are re-interviewed in successive waves – the latest 
available being 2008. Detailed information on unsecured debt and asset holding is available 
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in three waves: 1995, 2000 and 2005. Hence, these three waves are the primary focus of our 
empirical analysis, which is based on unbalanced panel data.  
We adopt two measures of social interaction, itSOC : firstly, a measure based on 
active club membership; and, secondly, a measure of the frequency at which such activities 
are undertaken. The first measure of social interaction is based on the responses to a series of 
questions asking individuals whether they are currently active in a range of clubs/groups, 
namely: a political party; trade unions; an environmental group; a parents’/school association; 
a tenants’/residents’ group or neighbourhood watch; a religious group or church organisation; 
a voluntary services group; any other community or civic group; a social club/working mens’ 
club; sports club; womens’ institute/townswomen's guild; or any other group or organisation. 
Our focus on active membership follows Putnam (2000), p.58, who argues that: 
“...formal “card-carrying” membership may not accurately reflect actual involvement 
in community activities. An individual who “belongs to” half a dozen community 
groups may actually be active in none. What really matters from the point of view of 
social capital and civic engagement is not merely nominal membership, but active and 
involved membership.” 
Hence, we use the responses to the questions described above in order to proxy the social 
interaction of the individual by constructing an index of the number of clubs that the 
individual is currently active in, where the index runs from zero clubs to four plus clubs. Our 
measure of social interaction based on club membership accords with that frequently used in 
the existing literature, see, for example, Putnam (2000), Glaeser et al. (2002) and Brown and 
Taylor (2009). When we adopt this measure of social interaction, the overall sample size 
across the 1995, 2000 and 2005 waves is 29,259 observations. 
 The second measure of social interaction is based upon the frequency at which an 
individual undertakes a number of activities and hence provides a time dimension to the 
measure of social interaction. Specifically, these activities include: how often they attend 
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evening classes; local groups; and/or undertake voluntary work, where the potential responses 
are as follows: never; once a year or less; several times a year; at least once a month; and at 
least once a week. We group these different types of social interaction into a single index 
adopting a hybrid combination of the questions by generating an additive scale based upon 
Cronbach's alpha ranging from 0 to 4, where the scale of reliability for the frequency of social 
interaction has a value of 0.7. This measure of social interaction thus provides a time 
dimension to such activities, thereby giving an insight into the intensity of social interaction. 
The frequency at which an individual undertakes social interaction is entered as a set of 
dummy variables with ‘never’ as the omitted category. Using this measure of social 
interaction, the overall sample size is 19,191 observations. 
The Types of Unsecured Debt and Financial Assets Held 
In order to explore the relationship between social interaction and the types of unsecured debt 
and financial assets held, we estimate a series of random effects probit models, where the 
dependent variable indicates whether or not the individual holds a particular type of debt or 
asset. For unsecured debt, we distinguish between six types of debt: hire purchase 
agreements; personal loans from banks, building societies or other financial institutions; 
credit cards; loans from private individuals; overdrafts; and other debt including catalogue or 
mail purchase agreements and student loans. With respect to financial assets, we again 
distinguish between six types, namely: national savings certificates, national savings, 
building society and insurance bonds; premium bonds;1 unit/investment trusts; personal 
equity plans; shares; and other investments, government or company securities.2  
                                                           
1
 Premium bonds are a financial product offered by the National Savings and Investments of the UK 
Government, where, instead of interest payments, investors have the chance to win tax-free prizes. Hence, this 
type of financial asset is quite distinct from the other assets in terms of its return. 
2
 Unfortunately, information regarding the amount held in each debt and asset category is unavailable. 
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Defining *itP  as a continuous unobserved latent dependent variable, such as the utility 
gained from holding a particular type of debt or asset, and itP  as the observed empirical 
binary counterpart, our probit specifications, which model the type of debt or assets held by 
individual i at time t, are defined as follows: 
*
11 ' 0
0
it it it itit
it
P if P SOC
P otherwise
λ ε
−
= = + + >
=
ψ X
       (1)
 
where itX  denotes a vector of individual and household characteristics, which is described in 
detail below, 1itSOC −  denotes our measure of social interaction, as described above, 
i=1,…,n, t=1,…,T and it i itε α ν= + . Our measure of social interaction is lagged since, as 
argued by Angrist and Pischke (2009), such an approach reduces the potential for reverse 
causality with social interaction being measured ex ante, that is, it predates the outcome 
variable, i.e. in this case, the type of debt or assets held.3 We adopt a random effects 
specification, where the individual specific unobservable effect in the error term is denoted 
by iα  and itν  is a random error term, i.e. itν ∼ ( )20, itIID σ . This specification allows for 
correlation between the error terms of individuals over time, i.e. 
( ) ( )2 2 2,il ikcorr l kα α νρ ε ε σ σ σ= = + ≠ . 
The Amount of Unsecured Debt, Financial Assets and Net Worth 
We then explore the relationship between social interaction and the amount of unsecured debt 
( itd ) and the total value of financial assets ( ita ) held by the individual at a given point in 
time. In order to explore the determinants of assets and debt, we treat ita  and itd  as censored 
                                                           
3
 When the measure of social interaction is defined as the number of clubs that the individual is an active 
member of, due to data constraints, the matching is as follows: 1994 club membership to 1995 debt or assets; 
1999 club membership to 2000 debt or assets; and 2003 club membership to 2005 debt or assets. Similarly, 
when social interaction is based upon the frequency measure, the matching is as follows: 1998 frequency to 
2000 debt or assets and 2004 frequency to 2005 debt or assets. 
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variables in our econometric analysis since they cannot have negative values. Following 
Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002), we employ a censored regression approach to ascertain 
the determinants of ( )ln ita  and ( )ln itd , which allows for the truncation of the dependent 
variables.4 We denote by ( )*ln ita  and ( )*ln itd  the corresponding untruncated latent variables, 
which theoretically can have negative values. We model ( )ln ita  and ( )ln itd  via a random 
effects tobit specification for each dependent variable as follows: 
( ) 11* 1ln 1it it ititd SOC    γ ε−′= + +β X         (2) 
( ) ( ) ( )ln  ln ln 0* *it it itd d if d= >        (3) 
( )ln 0itd otherwise=         (4) 
( ) 22* 1ln 2it it itita SOC    γ ε−′= + +β X         (5) 
( ) ( ) ( )ln  ln ln 0* *it it ita a if a= >        (6) 
( )ln 0ita otherwise=         (7) 
where the debts (assets) of individual i at time t are given by itd  ( ita ) such that i=1,…,n and 
t=1,…,T, itX  denotes a vector of individual and household characteristics, 1itSOC −
 
denotes 
lagged social interaction and 
1itε  and 2itε  are the stochastic disturbance terms. In both 
equations, as above, the structure of the error terms is given as follows: it i itε α η= + , where 
iα  is an individual specific unobservable effect, and itη  is a random error term, 
( )20,it itIIDη σ .  
                                                           
4
 In order to deal with the zero values of unsecured debt and financial assets, we add one to each series. 
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We then explore the relationship between net worth and social interaction. As argued 
by Barwell et al. (2006), the overall state of a household’s balance sheet is determined by 
their net worth, i.e. the relative size of their assets and liabilities. Thus, we combine the level 
of assets and debts at the household level to measure the household’s net worth: the 
difference between total household financial assets and total debt.5 We conduct panel random 
effects analysis of the determinants of log net worth, ( )ln itnw , as follows: 
( ) 1ln ht ht ht htnw SOC    θ ε−′= + +π X          (8) 
 where ( ) ( )ln lnht ht htnw a d= −  if ( ) 0ht hta d− > ; ( ) ( ) ( )ln 1 lnht ht htnw a d= − −  if 
( ) 0ht hta d− < , otherwise ( )ln htnw  is set to zero since there are no values of ( )ht hta d−  
between zero and unity. The number of observations for this part of the analysis falls to 
15,002 for the club membership measure of social interaction and 9,788 for the frequency 
measure since the analysis is conducted at the household level given that net worth is 
generally regarded as a household level concept. Hence, the measures of social interaction 
included in equation (8) above relate to the head of household, h. Once again, the error 
structure allows for correlation over time: specifically, ht h htε α η= +  where hα  is a head of 
household specific unobservable effect and htη  is a random error term, ( )20,ht htIIDη σ .  
 The control variables included in the matrix X are the same in each of the models 
estimated. The matrix X includes: age binary controls for whether the individual is aged 18 to 
24, aged 25 to 34, aged 35 to 44, aged 45-54 (where aged 55 and above is the omitted 
category); a male dummy variable; a dummy variable for whether the individual is married or 
cohabiting; a binary indicator for whether the individual is white; the natural logarithm of 
labour income; the natural logarithm of other income; binary controls for housing tenure, 
                                                           
5
 Following the standard approach in the existing literature, in order to measure household net worth, we include 
the value of property in the definition of financial assets and mortgage debt in household liabilities. 
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specifically whether the home is owned outright, owned on a mortgage, or rented (other 
tenure status is the omitted category); binary controls for employment status, specifically 
whether the individual is an employee, self-employed or unemployed (retired, full time 
student, maternity leave and government training form the omitted category); the number of 
children and the number of adults in the household; a binary control for whether the 
individual is in good or excellent health (poor health is the reference group); and, finally, the 
highest level of educational attainment, distinguishing between degree level, nursing or 
teaching qualifications, Advanced (A) levels, General Certificate of Secondary Education 
GCSEs),6 other educational qualifications and no educational qualifications (the omitted 
category).  
For the two estimation samples, Table 1A provides summary statistics for each of the 
dependent variables modelled, Table 1B presents summary statistics for the alternative 
measures of social interaction and in Table 1C summary statistics relating to the variables in 
X are shown. All monetary variables are deflated to 1991 prices. Figures 1 and 2 present 
distributional plots of unsecured debt and financial assets, respectively, for 1995, 2000 and 
2005. Whilst there appears to have been no shift in the distribution of financial assets over 
time, the distribution and mean of unsecured debt has shifted to the right, with individuals 
holding higher levels of debt over the time period. Finally, around 30% (24%) of individuals 
are active members of one club (undertake social interaction once a year or less), but the 
proportion of individuals undertaking social interaction decreases monotonically as the 
intensity increases (see Table 1B). 
 
 
                                                           
6
 GCSE level qualifications are taken after eleven years of formal compulsory schooling and approximate to the 
U.S. honours high school curriculum. The A level qualification is a public examination taken by 18 year olds 
over a two year period studying between one to four subjects and is the main determinant of eligibility for entry 
to higher education in the UK. 
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III. Results 
The Types of Unsecured Debt and Financial Assets Held 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (1) relating to the determinants of the 
probability of holding debt and the likelihood of holding particular types of debt. Across the 
different types of debt, a positive correlation in the unobserved effects is found over time 
highlighting the importance of the panel element of the data, although for those holding an 
overdraft this effect is small and statistically insignificant, which may reflect the temporary 
nature of this type of debt. 
Turning briefly to the covariates in X, being aged 25 to 34 increases the probability of 
being in debt by around 20 percentage points compared to those aged 55 and over. The 
influence of life cycle effects is also evident across the different types of debt. For example, 
being aged 25 to 34 increases the probability of holding a personal loan by 9.9 percentage 
points but this effect falls to 0.6 percentage points in the case of borrowing from a private 
individual (compared to those aged 55 and above). Housing tenure has a large influence upon 
the likelihood of holding debt, where owning a home outright lowers the probability of being 
in debt by approximately 19 percentage points. Both employees and the self-employed are 
about 8 percentage points less likely to be in debt compared to the reference category, 
whereas labour income and income from other sources both increase the probability of being 
in debt. However, employment status has a statistically insignificant effect in the case of hire 
purchase and credit card debt. Furthermore, employment status does not always have the 
same direction of influence across the different types of debt. For example, being an 
employee increases (decreases) the probability of having a personal loan (overdraft) by 3.4 
percentage points. Such findings highlight the heterogeneity across the different types of 
unsecured debt. Education has a positive influence on the probability of holding debt with the 
largest influence coming from having a degree. The role of household composition, on the 
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other hand, is somewhat mixed. The number of children and the number of adults in the 
household both increase the probability of being in debt, but have no role in explaining the 
likelihood of having a personal loan, a loan from a private individual or an overdraft. Finally, 
those individuals in good or excellent health have a lower probability of holding unsecured 
debt.  
Turning now to the focus of our analysis, the role of social interaction is investigated 
by employing a set of binary controls for the number of clubs of which the individual is an 
active member (see Table 2) and a set of binary controls for the frequency of social 
interaction (see Table 4 Panel A, where, for brevity, the results are summarised). It is 
apparent that there is no clear effect from either measure of social interaction on the 
probability of being in debt or on the probability of holding a particular type of debt. For 
example, there is no evidence of monotonicity: a priori, one might expect the intensity of 
social interaction to matter and, hence, a monotonic relationship to manifest in terms of the 
magnitudes of the marginal effects. The effect of social interaction, however, is often 
statistically insignificant, especially at the higher levels of intensity. In addition, there appears 
to be no clear pattern with respect to the direction of influence of social interaction on 
unsecured debt. For example, active club membership, where statistically significant, has a 
positive influence upon the probability of holding debt (see Table 2), yet, in comparison, the 
frequency of social interaction has a mixed effect, see Table 4 Panel A. Specifically, 
undertaking social interaction once a year or less (at least once a week) increases (decreases) 
the probability of holding debt by 1.2 (12) percentage points in comparison to never 
undertaking social interaction. 
Turning to financial assets, the results of estimating equation (1) relating to the 
determinants of the probability of holding financial assets and the likelihood of holding 
particular types of financial assets are shown in Table 3. There are clear life cycle effects, 
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with those aged 18 to 24 approximately 16 percentage points less likely to hold financial 
assets than those aged over 54. This effect is particularly heightened for premium bonds, 
personal equity plans and company shares, where individuals aged 18 to 24 have around a 9 
percentage points lower probability of holding such assets (in comparison to the reference 
group). Those individuals who are married, white, in good/excellent health, own their home 
either outright or with a mortgage and have some educational qualifications are more likely to 
own financial assets. The largest influence stems from educational attainment, which has a 
monotonic effect on the probability of owning financial assets: for example, an individual 
with a degree has around a 20 percentage points higher probability of owning assets 
compared to an individual with no qualifications. In terms of the type of financial assets held, 
the effects of education are particularly pronounced for premium bonds, personal equity plans 
and shares. 
With respect to the role of social interaction, in contrast to the case of unsecured debt, 
there is evidence of monotonicity. For example, focusing upon club membership, being a 
member of one club (compared to no clubs) increases the probability of holding financial 
assets by 2.9 percentage points, whereas, for those individuals who are members of four or 
more clubs, the probability of owning financial assets increases by over 11 percentage points. 
Evidence that the extent of club membership matters is also evident across the different types 
of financial assets, with the exception of national savings, where the largest effects are found 
for owning shares – arguably the riskiest and most complex type of asset to hold. Table 4 
Panel B presents the results of estimating equation (1) based upon the alternative measure of 
social interaction, i.e. the frequency measure. Clearly, the frequency of social interaction has 
a positive influence on the likelihood of holding financial assets per se as well as across the 
different types of financial assets. However, in contrast to club membership, there is no 
evidence of the frequency of social interaction having a monotonic influence as the intensity 
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increases. The only exception relates to share ownership, where undertaking social 
interaction once a year or less (at least once a month) increases the likelihood of owning 
shares by 1.4 (2.8) percentage points. The positive effect of social interaction on share 
ownership is consistent with the findings in the existing literature, see, for example, Hong et 
al. (2004) and Christelis et al. (2010). 
The Amount of Unsecured Debt, Financial Assets and Net Worth 
In this section, we explore the relationship between social interaction and the amount of 
unsecured debt and financial assets held by estimating equations (2) to (4) and equations (5) 
to (7), respectively, where the dependent variables are truncated as discussed in Section II 
above. We also investigate the relationship between social interaction and household net 
worth, i.e. the difference between household financial assets and liabilities, by estimating 
equation (8), where net worth is treated as a continuous variable. To allow for the panel 
nature of the data, random effects specifications are estimated throughout. The results are 
presented in Table 5, where there is clear evidence of positive intra-correlation in the 
unobserved effects over time.  
Focusing initially on the determinants of unsecured debt, as shown in the first and 
fourth columns of Table 5 for the club membership and frequency measures, respectively, it 
is apparent that life cycle effects are evident. For example, individuals aged 25 to 34 
(followed by those aged 18 to 24) have the highest levels of unsecured debt. For the active 
club membership measure of social interaction, the expected value function of truncated 
logged unsecured debt, when all covariates, including the dummy variables, are equal to 0 (in 
the reference categories), is evaluated as follows: 
( ){ } ( ) ( )0 0 01ln 0, 0it it itE d SOC β σ β σφ β σ−= = = Φ +X  
which has the value of 1.961, i.e. 
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( ){ }
( ) ( )
1ln 0, 0
8.486 6.182 8.486 6.182 8.486 6.182
it it itE d SOC
φ
−
= = =
   Φ − × − + × −   
X
 
where φ  and Φ  denote the density and cumulative distributions of the standard normal 
distribution, 0β  is the (unscaled) intercept and σ  is the standard error of the regression. 
Hence, log unsecured debt is 1.961 for the aged over 54 group as compared to 
1.961+3.548=5.51 for the aged 25 to 34 group. Hence, individuals aged 25 to 34 hold nearly 
three times (5.51/1.96=2.81) as much unsecured debt as individuals in the oldest age 
category. Based upon the average value of unsecured debt (see Table 1A), this implies a level 
of unsecured debt of £5,707 for those aged 25 to 34 as compared to £2,031 for those aged 
over 54. Turning briefly to the other covariates in X, the level of unsecured debt is increasing 
in both labour income and other income sources. As compared to individuals reporting poor 
health, those who report good or excellent health have lower levels of unsecured debt, which 
is also the case for employed and self-employed individuals.  
In accordance with the findings related to debt holding, for both measures of social 
interaction, the influence of social interaction on the level of unsecured debt is found to be 
ambiguous. For example, being an active member of one or two clubs has a positive and 
significant influence on unsecured debt, yet club membership appears to have no influence 
beyond membership of two clubs. Furthermore, the frequency measure is largely statistically 
insignificant throughout and, where significant, has a negative effect. Turning to the level of 
financial assets, where the results are shown in the second and fifth columns of Table 5, the 
importance of social interaction for this aspect of finances is once again evident. Thus, social 
interaction appears to influence the amount of assets held as well as financial asset holding 
per se. The findings support a monotonic relationship between active club membership and 
the level of financial assets. For example, evaluating the expected value function of truncated 
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logged financial assets, when all covariates, including the dummy variables, are equal to 0 (in 
the reference categories), the log amount of financial assets is given as: 
( ){ }
( ) ( )
1ln 0, 0
15.926 7.043 15.926 7.043 15.926 7.043 1.218
it it itE a SOC
φ
−
= = =
   Φ − × − + × − =   
X
 
Hence, the log level of financial assets is 1.218 for those individuals who are not members of 
any club as compared to 1.218+3.302=4.52 for those who are members of four or more clubs. 
Hence, individuals who are active members of four or more clubs have nearly four times 
(4.52/1.22=3.70) the level of financial assets as compared to those who are not active 
members of any club. Evaluated at the mean, this implies financial assets of £12,506 as 
compared to £3,380. 
 Covariates in X, which have positive effects on the level of financial assets held by 
individuals, are income, being male, marital status, owning the home outright, being in good 
or excellent health and educational attainment. As in the case of unsecured debt, life cycle 
effects are evident where the level of financial assets is increasing in age, which accords with 
the findings of Brown and Taylor (2008). Interestingly, being employed or self-employed is 
associated with holding a lower level of financial assets as compared to the reference 
category (which includes retirees). Such effects were also apparent when modelling the level 
of unsecured debt.7 
 The third and sixth columns of Table 5 report the results from modelling the level of 
household net worth, i.e. equation (8). Life cycle effects are once again evident with 
households with heads aged 18 to 24 having the lowest levels of net worth as compared to 
households with heads aged over 54. Households with male heads have lower levels of net 
worth as is the case for households with white or unemployed heads. The association between 
                                                           
7
 We have also jointly modelled the level of unsecured debt and the level of financial assets as a bivariate tobit 
model, which allows for correlation between the two equations. The results are in line with those reported herein 
and are available upon request. 
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labour income and net worth is found to be inelastic as is the association between other 
income sources and net worth. For example, a one percent increase in income from sources 
other than paid employment is associated with around a 0.1 percent increase in net worth. As 
in the case of the level of unsecured debt and the level of financial assets, the level of net 
worth is monotonically increasing in educational attainment. Where statistically significant, 
the number of clubs that the head of household belongs to is positively and monotonically 
associated with net worth. The pattern is less clear when the frequency measure of social 
interaction is employed, although the influence is positive when statistically significant. 
Robustness 
In order to explore the robustness of our findings, we repeat the analysis presented in Tables 
2 to 5 instrumenting the measure of social interaction. Given that the selection of instruments 
is always subject to debate, we explore two different instruments. Firstly, in order to allow for 
neighbourhood effects, we use the average rate of social interaction in the local authority 
district that the individual resides in. Secondly, following Agarwal et al (2011), who argue 
that mobility weakens an individual’s investment in social capital as well as their social 
connections, we use a measure of the individual’s geographical mobility, i.e. the number of 
years they have resided in their current home. The Wald-test for the significance of the 
instruments in the first-stage regression shows that they are strongly significant and endorses 
the validity of the chosen instruments. The results are summarised in Tables 6 and 7, where, 
for brevity, we only present the marginal effects relating to the social interaction variables.8 
It is apparent from Table 6 Panel A that, once we instrument the club membership 
measure, a statistically significant inverse effect of social interaction is found for the 
probability of having debt, the probability of credit card debt, the probability of having an 
                                                           
8
 The standard errors have been adjusted to allow for the inclusion of the predicted variables. It should also be 
noted that the estimated coefficients of the predicted allowance and hours variables might be inconsistent, see 
Wooldridge (2010). However, we are primarily concerned with only the sign and the significance of the effect in 
order to ascertain the robustness of our previous results. 
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overdraft and the probability of having other types of debt. Such findings further highlight the 
extent to which social interaction has distinct influences across different aspects of household 
finances, with positive statistically significant marginal effects for social interaction found 
across all financial asset categories (see Table 6 Panel B), which is consistent with and, 
hence, endorses our earlier findings. A similar pattern of results is apparent in Table 6 Panels 
C and D for the frequency measure, although, it is interesting to note that the positive effects 
related to social interaction and financial asset holding are less pronounced in this case. In 
Table 7, it is apparent that club membership is inversely (positively) associated with the 
amount of debt (assets) held. The inverse association between debt and social interaction is 
also apparent for the frequency measure, although the effect of social interaction on financial 
asset holding fails to reach statistical significance here. Overall, our empirical results based 
on instrumenting social interaction lend further support to our finding that social interaction 
has distinct influences on different aspects of household finances.  
IV. Conclusion 
We have contributed to the growing body of empirical literature analysing the implications of 
social interaction in the economy, focusing on its role in financial and economic decision-
making. To be specific, we have explored the relationship between social interaction and a 
range of financial assets varying from stocks and shares to savings, as well as the relationship 
between social interaction and different types of unsecured debt, thereby redressing the 
imbalance in the existing literature, which has focused predominantly on stock market 
participation. Our comprehensive empirical analysis of the relationship between social 
interaction and a wide range of aspects of household finances has served to further our 
understanding of the implications of social interaction for financial and economic outcomes. 
Our findings suggest that social interaction has a positive influence upon the types of 
financial assets held, which is particularly pronounced for the holding of stocks and shares. 
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Social interaction is also found to influence the amount of financial assets held as well as the 
level of household net worth. In contrast, there appears to be no clear relationship between 
social interaction and the holding of unsecured debt, suggesting that social interaction has 
distinct effects across different parts of the household balance sheet. Once we instrument for 
social interaction, however, an inverse association between debt and social interaction is 
found, which suggests that a relationship may exist between social interaction and financial 
problems. Indeed, Putnam (2000), p.193, comments that: “people with lower incomes and 
those who feel financially strapped are much less engaged in all forms of social and 
community life than those who are better off .... Even social activities with little or no 
financial cost are inhibited by financial distress.” Such arguments predict an inverse 
association between financial distress and social interaction, which has implications for the 
phenomenon of social exclusion, and, hence, highlight the importance of conducting further 
research in this area.  
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TABLE 1A: Summary Statistics – Dependent Variables 
 Club Membership Frequency 
AMOUNT MEAN STD. MEAN STD. 
Log unsecured debt 2.919 3.786 2.972 3.904 
Unsecured debt £ (1991 prices) £2,031 £7,910 £2,491 £9,334 
Log financial assets 1.639 3.111 1.596 3.287 
Financial assets £ (1991 prices) £3,380 £21,673 £3,278 £20,898 
Log net worth 7.334 6.965 7.777 6.964 
Net worth £ (1991 prices) £94,919 £165,726 £121,390 £193,799 
TYPE OF DEBT [0/1]     
Hire purchase  0.105 0.306 0.093 0.291 
Personal loan  0.177 0.382 0.178 0.382 
Credit card  0.171 0.377 0.170 0.376 
Private individual 0.012 0.110 0.011 0.105 
Overdraft 0.048 0.213 0.065 0.246 
Other debt 0.123 0.329 0.122 0.328 
TYPE OF FINANCIAL ASSET [0/1]     
National savings 0.019 0.138 0.014 0.116 
Premium bonds 0.158 0.364 0.148 0.355 
Unit trusts 0.054 0.226 0.054 0.225 
Personal equity plans 0.093 0.291 0.100 0.301 
Shares 0.149 0.356 0.142 0.349 
Other investments 0.058 0.233 0.036 0.187 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 19,191 
TABLE 1B: Summary Statistics – Control Variables: Social Interaction 
 MEAN STD. MEAN STD. 
0 Clubs (t-1) 0.566 0.496 – 
1 Club (t-1) 0.297 0.457 – 
2 Clubs (t-1) 0.097 0.296 – 
3 Clubs (t-1) 0.030 0.172 – 
4+ Clubs (t-1) 0.010 0.101 – 
Never (t-1) – 0.610 0.488 
Once a year or less (t-1) – 0.242 0.428 
Several times a year (t-1) – 0.084 0.277 
At least once a month (t-1) – 0.050 0.219 
At least once a week (t-1) – 0.014 0.117 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 19,191 
TABLE 1C: Summary Statistics – Control Variables: Other Covariates 
 Club Membership Frequency 
 MEAN STD. MEAN STD. 
Aged 18-24 0.128 0.125 0.125 0.330 
Aged 25-34 0.221 0.415 0.212 0.409 
Aged 35-44 0.250 0.433 0.257 0.437 
Aged 45-54 0.215 0.411 0.213 0.409 
Aged 55 and above§ 0.186 0.369 0.193 0.395 
Male 0.535 0.499 0.538 0.498 
Married 0.585 0.493 0.569 0.495 
White 0.913 0.282 0.885 0.319 
Log labour income 6.661 1.791 6.726 1.926 
Log other income 4.988 3.381 5.107 3.428 
Own outright 0.198 0.399 0.209 0.407 
Mortgage 0.548 0.498 0.547 0.498 
Rent 0.122 0.327 0.111 0.315 
Other housing tenure§ 0.132 0.338 0.133 0.340 
Employee 0.622 0.485 0.634 0.482 
Self employed 0.085 0.280 0.085 0.278 
Unemployed 0.041 0.197 0.035 0.184 
Other employment status§ 0.252 0.434 0.246 0.431 
Number of (#) Children 0.667 1.011 0.661 1.007 
Number of (#) Adults 2.364 1.042 2.384 1.068 
Good/Ex. Health 0.720 0.449 0.718 0.450 
Degree 0.135 0.342 0.146 0.353 
Teaching/Nurse 0.265 0.441 0.286 0.452 
A level 0.127 0.333 0.125 0.331 
O level 0.177 0.381 0.165 0.371 
Other qualification 0.076 0.265 0.070 0.256 
No educational qualification§ 0.222 0.414 0.208 0.405 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 19,191 
Note: § denotes reference category. 
TABLE 2: Random Effects Probit Analysis – Type of Debt and Club Membership 
 PROB. 
OF HAVING 
DEBT 
HIRE 
PURCHASE 
PERSONAL 
LOAN 
CREDIT CARD PRIVATE 
INDIVIDUAL 
OVERDRAFT OTHER DEBT 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
1 Club (t-1) 0.019 2.51 0.001 0.25 0.010 1.94 0.009 1.95 -0.001 0.97 0.001 0.45 -0.001 0.26 
2 Clubs (t-1) 0.030 2.67 0.010 1.94 0.009 1.14 0.025 3.53 -0.001 1.20 -0.008 1.83 -0.012 2.07 
3 Clubs (t-1) 0.017 0.89 0.016 1.87 0.022 1.75 -0.005 0.43 -0.000 0.02 -0.012 1.54 -0.028 2.61 
4+ Clubs (t-1) 0.028 0.85 0.006 0.38 0.008 0.38 0.002 0.11 0.000 0.03 -0.024 1.61 -0.057 2.70 
Aged 18-24 0.205 13.09 0.009 1.12 0.059 5.46 0.022 2.07 0.007 3.32 0.062 10.46 0.082 10.28 
Aged 25-34 0.209 15.94 0.047 7.21 0.099 10.92 0.060 6.93 0.006 3.24 0.029 5.24 0.088 12.31 
Aged 35-44 0.129 9.92 0.033 5.13 0.063 6.99 0.054 6.25 0.004 2.52 0.015 2.61 0.052 7.40 
Aged 45-54 0.070 6.01 0.022 3.72 0.033 3.96 0.026 3.32 0.002 1.68 0.004 0.68 0.026 4.08 
Male -0.027 3.54 0.018 5.30 0.031 6.43 -0.017 3.32 0.001 0.67 0.001 0.13 -0.098 2.24 
Married -0.038 4.51 0.017 4.22 -0.007 1.26 -0.015 2.82 -0.002 2.34 -0.019 6.14 -0.015 3.57 
White 0.107 8.07 0.034 5.04 0.028 3.20 0.021 2.37 0.001 0.82 -0.006 1.62 0.040 5.81 
Log labour income 0.011 4.30 0.006 3.98 0.010 4.96 0.004 2.10 0.001 1.97 -0.001 1.04 -0.002 1.47 
Log other income 0.027 12.29 0.005 4.78 0.012 7.84 0.013 8.84 -0.000 0.56 0.005 6.35 0.004 4.11 
Own outright -0.189 14.56 -0.024 3.52 -0.088 9.62 -0.059 6.65 -0.003 2.61 -0.039 8.32 -0.071 10.46 
Mortgage -0.029 2.73 0.016 3.05 -0.001 0.10 0.025 3.64 -0.002 2.05 -0.017 5.22 -0.039 7.68 
Rent 0.023 1.73 0.025 3.73 -0.005 0.59 -0.037 3.92 0.000 0.80 -0.034 6.58 0.019 3.25 
Employee -0.081 5.79 0.003 0.45 0.034 3.40 -0.004 0.43 0.001 1.25 -0.034 6.98 -0.029 4.38 
Self employed -0.078 -4.60 0.015 1.87 0.023 2.00 0.008 0.70 0.004 2.56 -0.018 3.00 -0.038 4.24 
Unemployed 0.006 0.35 -0.002 0.19 0.049 3.76 0.015 1.14 0.003 2.41 -0.014 2.06 0.003 0.39 
# Children 0.010 2.43 0.007 4.07 0.004 1.67 -0.001 0.25 0.000 0.21 0.002 1.11 0.008 4.22 
# Adults -0.012 3.36 -0.005 2.84 0.002 0.74 -0.009 3.80 -0.000 0.18 0.002 1.77 0.003 1.72 
Good/Ex. Health -0.048 6.30 -0.012 3.32 -0.036 7.10 -0.019 3.88 -0.002 2.69 -0.007 2.47 -0.020 5.32 
Degree 0.146 10.58 0.008 1.18 0.064 6.91 0.084 9.15 0.004 2.82 0.082 5.48 0.021 3.02 
Teaching/Nurse 0.138 12.23 0.020 3.66 0.083 10.68 0.092 11.71 0.002 2.30 0.045 9.06 0.000 0.16 
A level 0.121 9.10 0.020 3.13 0.053 5.79 0.076 8.32 0.002 1.76 0.045 8.50 0.004 0.54 
O level 0.116 9.58 0.029 5.05 0.058 6.99 0.082 9.84 0.001 1.38 0.024 4.56 0.015 2.60 
Other qualification 0.113 7.33 0.021 2.82 0.060 5.73 0.052 4.92 0.001 0.98 0.009 1.33 0.030 4.18 
ρ; p value 0.389; p=0.000 0.292; p=0.000 0.308; p=0.000 0.426; p=0.000 0.367; p=0.000 0.001; p=0.490 0.406; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(43); p value 1,999.1; p=0.000 752.1; p=0.000 1,461.2; p=0.000 1,213.8; p=0.000 163.5; p=0.000 1,362.9; p=0.000 1,221.9; p=0.000 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 
Notes: Regional dummy variables are included as additional controls; M.E. denotes marginal effect.
TABLE 3: Random Effects Probit Analysis – Type of Asset and Club Membership 
 PROB. OF 
HAVING 
ASSETS 
NATIONAL 
SAVINGS 
PREMIUM 
BONDS 
UNIT TRUSTS PERSONAL 
EQUITY PLAN 
SHARES OTHER 
INVESTMENTS 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
1 Club (t-1) 0.029 5.20 0.001 2.17 0.015 4.68 0.005 3.35 0.007 2.23 0.020 5.22 0.009 3.48 
2 Clubs (t-1) 0.062 7.64 0.001 2.41 0.028 5.83 0.010 4.80 0.019 4.64 0.051 9.41 0.022 5.87 
3 Clubs (t-1) 0.067 5.14 0.001 2.43 0.032 4.25 0.013 4.15 0.028 4.55 0.056 6.52 0.030 5.32 
4+ Clubs (t-1) 0.111 5.09 0.003 3.07 0.045 3.64 0.020 4.23 0.039 4.03 0.057 3.98 0.049 5.67 
Aged 18-24 -0.163 12.68 -0.000 0.09 -0.091 10.73 -0.031 6.78 -0.094 11.06 -0.088 9.14 -0.013 2.14 
Aged 25-34 -0.110 11.21 -0.001 2.27 -0.082 12.30 -0.023 7.59 -0.064 11.93 -0.044 6.43 -0.015 3.35 
Aged 35-44 -0.060 6.35 -0.000 1.23 -0.053 9.10 -0.011 4.23 -0.032 6.76 -0.013 2.06 -0.014 3.16 
Aged 45-54 -0.033 4.06 0.000 0.32 -0.023 5.20 -0.003 1.72 -0.008 2.02 -0.006 1.13 -0.009 2.29 
Male 0.025 4.33 -0.000 0.95 -0.003 0.74 0.007 4.52 0.009 3.01 0.025 5.88 0.001 0.37 
Married 0.049 7.41 0.001 2.32 0.030 7.11 0.009 4.56 0.023 6.56 0.031 6.55 0.017 5.65 
White 0.054 4.81 0.001 2.24 0.035 4.75 0.004 1.23 0.009 1.52 0.031 3.84 0.018 3.55 
Log labour income 0.012 5.45 0.002 1.69 0.003 2.01 0.003 4.67 0.012 8.57 0.010 5.74 0.003 3.21 
Log other income 0.013 7.52 -0.000 0.33 0.004 4.22 0.001 1.20 0.001 1.59 0.005 3.85 0.001 0.78 
Own outright 0.103 10.10 0.002 3.11 0.046 7.27 0.030 8.11 0.072 11.76 0.096 12.04 0.041 7.99 
Mortgage 0.072 8.09 0.001 1.60 0.023 4.19 0.012 4.17 0.033 6.10 0.065 9.32 0.023 5.13 
Rent -0.080 6.04 -0.001 1.85 -0.042 5.11 -0.022 4.02 -0.060 5.70 -0.051 4.67 -0.013 2.00 
Employee -0.075 6.73 -0.001 2.14 -0.026 3.96 -0.011 3.43 -0.023 3.70 -0.020 2.55 -0.011 2.14 
Self employed -0.068 5.24 -0.000 0.84 -0.011 1.54 -0.005 1.42 0.002 0.35 -0.011 1.23 -0.009 1.56 
Unemployed -0.018 1.10 -0.001 1.07 -0.001 0.08 -0.019 3.02 -0.010 0.98 -0.011 0.89 -0.008 1.01 
# Children -0.020 6.18 -0.002 1.26 -0.008 4.09 -0.004 4.19 -0.080 4.52 -0.017 7.29 -0.006 3.65 
# Adults -0.024 7.96 -0.004 2.60 -0.011 5.97 -0.006 5.86 -0.011 6.09 -0.016 7.32 -0.008 5.18 
Good/Ex. Health 0.025 4.27 0.001 2.60 0.009 2.54 0.005 3.23 0.012 3.88 0.014 3.46 0.004 1.46 
Degree 0.198 18.72 0.003 3.31 0.087 11.74 0.038 9.74 0.099 16.24 0.118 14.66 0.041 8.34 
Teaching/Nurse 0.131 14.39 0.002 2.89 0.069 11.24 0.028 8.64 0.064 12.35 0.080 11.65 0.030 7.10 
A level 0.140 12.94 0.001 2.26 0.074 10.17 0.024 6.94 0.058 9.35 0.095 11.77 0.029 5.72 
O level 0.122 12.29 0.002 2.77 0.067 10.08 0.021 6.54 0.051 9.08 0.073 9.89 0.031 7.01 
Other qualification 0.077 6.05 0.000 0.22 0.040 5.03 0.008 2.21 0.033 4.74 0.046 5.02 0.022 4.03 
ρ; p value 0.470; p=0.000 0.630; p=0.000 0.688; p=0.000 0.540; p=0.000 0.458; p=0.000 0.565; p=0.000 183; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(43); p value 1,971.8; p=0.000 301.6; p=0.000 1,211.4; p=0.000 801.6; p=0.000 1,296.9; p=0.000 1,462.1; p=0.000 637.4; p=0.000 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 
Notes: Regional dummy variables are included as additional controls; M.E. denotes marginal effect. 
TABLE 4: Random Effects Probit Analysis – Type of Debt, Financial Assets and Frequency of Social Interaction 
 
PANEL A: DEBT 
PROB. OF 
HAVING DEBT 
HIRE 
PURCHASE 
PERSONAL 
LOAN 
CREDIT CARD PRIVATE 
INDIVIDUAL 
OVERDRAFT OTHER DEBT 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Once a year or less (t-1) 0.012 11.22 0.002 0.40 0.003 0.41 0.007 1.11 -0.001 0.97 0.007 1.65 -0.002 0.35 
Several times a year (t-1) -0.028 1.83 -0.010 1.54 -0.020 1.89 -0.015 1.58 -0.001 1.10 -0.001 0.14 0.002 0.23 
At least once a month (t-1) -0.018 0.93 -0.001 0.18 -0.006 0.43 -0.010 0.80 -0.001 0.88 -0.015 1.74 -0.008 0.86 
At least once a week (t-1) -0.120 3.30 -0.041 2.24 -0.054 2.12 -0.053 2.23 -0.002 0.66 -0.001 0.07 -0.037 1.92 
ρ; p value 0.425; p=0.000 0.306; p=0.000 0.330; p=0.000 0.428; p=0.000 0.390; p=0.000 0.001; p=0.489 0.392; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(43); p value 1,183.9; p=0.000 409.6; p=0.000 882.7; p=0.000 753.8; p=0.000 87.6; p=0.000 994.9; p=0.000 663.2; p=0.000 
OBSERVATIONS 19,191 
 
PANEL B: ASSETS 
PROB. OF 
HAVING 
ASSETS 
NATIONAL 
SAVINGS 
PREMIUM 
BONDS 
UNIT TRUSTS PERSONAL 
EQUITY PLAN 
SHARES OTHER 
INVESTMENTS 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Once a year or less (t-1) 0.037 5.14 0.000 1.06 0.011 2.81 0.006 3.44 0.021 5.26 0.014 2.98 0.004 1.83 
Several times a year (t-1) 0.058 5.59 0.001 1.11 0.020 3.48 0.007 3.11 0.028 4.94 0.028 4.05 0.007 2.64 
At least once a month (t-1) 0.029 2.21 0.002 1.08 0.007 1.04 0.009 3.08 0.017 2.32 0.028 3.28 0.007 1.93 
At least once a week (t-1) 0.042 1.79 0.000 0.32 0.026 2.11 0.007 1.42 0.013 1.00 0.017 1.12 0.005 0.78 
ρ; p value 0.542; p=0.000 0.763; p=0.000 0.731; p=0.000 0.613; p=0.000 0.468; p=0.000 0.594; p=0.000 0.344; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(43); p value 1,091.3; p=0.000 102.9; p=0.000 666.7; p=0.000 415.3; p=0.000 747.4; p=0.000 812.9; p=0.000 236.8; p=0.000 
OBSERVATIONS 19,191 
Notes: Additional control variables are as in Table 2; Regional dummy variables are included as additional controls; M.E. denotes marginal effect.
TABLE 5: Random Effects Analysis – Debt, Assets, Net Worth and Social Interaction 
 LOG UNSECURED 
DEBT (TOBIT) 
LOG FINANCIAL 
ASSETS (TOBIT) 
LOG NET 
WORTH 
LOG UNSECURED 
DEBT (TOBIT) 
LOG FINANCIAL 
ASSETS (TOBIT) 
LOG NET WORTH 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT COEF TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT COEF TSTAT 
Intercept -8.486 18.11 -15.926 21.63 6.095 14.28 -8.076 14.39 -16.686 18.83 6.059 12.21 
1 Club (t-1) 0.265 2.25 0.894 5.38 0.341 2.94 – – – 
2 Clubs (t-1) 0.427 2.37 1.882 7.91 0.418 2.40 – – – 
3 Clubs (t-1) 0.289 0.94 2.117 5.55 0.589 2.04 – – – 
4+ Clubs (t-1) 0.393 0.74 3.302 5.38 0.732 1.48 – – – 
Once a year or less (t-1) – – – 0.246 1.52 1.189 5.31 0.248 1.57 
Several times a year (t-1) – – – -0.456 1.79 1.867 5.76 0.581 2.38 
At least once a month (t-1) – – – -0.311 0.97 1.144 2.77 0.580 1.85 
At least once a week (t-1) – – – -1.840 3.01 1.366 1.89 1.288 2.26 
Aged 18-24 3.458 13.58 -5.351 13.57 -8.477 32.28 3.254 9.99 -5.896 11.52 -8.843 26.16 
Aged 25-34 3.548 16.37 -3.548 11.97 -5.547 28.83 3.352 12.21 -3.706 9.90 -5.092 21.39 
Aged 35-44 2.337 10.96 -1.966 6.91 -2.886 15.82 2.145 7.98 -1.736 4.90 -2.754 12.33 
Aged 45-54 1.292 6.79 -1.067 4.49 -1.382 8.86 0.913 3.69 -0.899 2.94 -1.255 6.31 
Male -0.132 1.07 0.925 5.13 -1.134 7.29 -0.064 0.42 0.925 4.35 -1.119 6.12 
Married -0.623 4.57 1.613 8.01 2.045 13.67 -0.794 4.61 1.744 7.01 2.220 12.18 
White 1.624 7.47 1.585 4.62 -0.640 2.75 1.408 5.94 1.089 2.93 -0.392 1.55 
Log labour income 0.213 4.84 0.468 6.75 -0.096 2.41 0.255 4.72 0.504 5.90 -0.152 3.19 
Log other income 0.489 13.65 0.385 7.37 0.107 3.19 0.535 11.78 0.467 7.09 0.064 1.55 
Own outright -3.218 15.07 3.595 11.57 – -3.594 13.35 4.236 10.80 – 
Mortgage -0.443 2.61 2.395 8.73 – -0.609 2.82 2.764 7.89 – 
Rent 0.061 0.28 -2.823 6.84 – -0.141 0.50 -2.957 5.39 – 
Employee -1.459 6.41 -2.484 7.34 1.388 5.83 -1.868 6.41 -2.938 6.77 2.268 7.65 
Self employed -1.202 4.37 -2.083 5.34 1.767 6.69 -1.355 3.86 -2.796 5.64 2.364 7.22 
Unemployed 0.024 0.08 -0.644 1.31 -0.806 2.90 0.329 0.83 -0.986 1.42 -1.218 3.17 
# Children 0.170 2.61 -0.699 7.00 -0.037 0.58 0.159 1.91 -0.761 6.22 -0.066 0.84 
# Adults -0.158 2.76 -0.788 8.59 0.004 0.06 -0.085 1.17 -0.963 8.29 -0.043 0.51 
Good/Ex. Health -0.819 6.67 0.850 4.73 1.134 9.47 -1.111 7.02 0.684 3.01 1.293 8.67 
Degree 2.993 13.27 6.613 20.20 2.363 10.75 3.596 12.71 6.821 16.60 2.127 8.07 
Teaching/Nurse 2.598 13.89 4.488 15.64 2.113 11.83 2.744 11.48 4.672 13.05 1.897 8.70 
A level 2.322 10.61 4.609 13.79 1.948 8.74 2.648 9.44 4.417 10.36 1.795 6.57 
O level 2.079 10.42 4.042 13.24 1.489 7.30 2.123 8.22 4.234 10.81 1.336 5.39 
Other qualification 1.886 7.45 2.536 6.50 0.972 3.78 1.674 5.06 2.265 4.45 0.674 2.10 
ρ; p value 0.351; p=0.000 0.436; p=0.000 0.472; p=0.000 0.384; p=0.000 0.498; p=0.000 0.529; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(d); p value 2,699.7; p=0.000 2,412.8; p=0.000 3,606.8; p=0.000 1,928.4; p=0.000 1,711.5; p=0.000 2,602.5; p=0.000 
σ 6.182; p=0.000 7.043; p=0.000 – 6.274; p=0.000 6.579; p=0.000 – 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 15,002 19,191 9,788 
Notes: Regional dummy variables are included as additional controls; M.E. denotes marginal effect; d=43 except for the net worth regressions where d=40; for the net worth specifications, the 
head of household is the unit of observation; the intercept is not scaled. 
TABLE 6: Random Effects Probit Analysis – Type of Debt and Financial Asset: Predicted Social Interaction 
 
PANEL A: DEBT: IV 
CLUB 
PROB. 
OF HAVING 
DEBT 
HIRE 
PURCHASE 
PERSONAL 
LOAN 
CREDIT CARD PRIVATE 
INDIVIDUAL 
OVERDRAFT OTHER DEBT 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Predicted club 
membership 
-0.030 2.56 -0.032 0.58 -0.011 1.46 -0.016 2.21 0.001 0.33 -0.036 7.64 -0.037 5.27 
ρ; p value 0.387; p=0.000 0.291; p=0.000 0.307; p=0.000 0.426; p=0.000 0.365; p=0.000 0.001; p=0.491 0.405; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(40); p value 2,002.2; p=0.000 749.5; p=0.000 1,462.1; p=0.000 1,209.0; p=0.000 163.0; p=0.000 1,417.9; p=0.000 1,224.4; p=0.000 
 
PANEL B: ASSET: IV 
CLUB 
PROB. OF 
HAVING 
ASSETS 
NATIONAL 
SAVINGS 
PREMIUM 
BONDS 
UNIT TRUSTS PERSONAL 
EQUITY PLAN 
SHARES OTHER 
INVESTMENTS 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Predicted club 
membership 
0.039 5.07 0.001 2.95 0.022 4.96 0.001 2.76 0.007 2.88 0.031 6.11 0.031 8.65 
ρ; p value 0.472; p=0.000 0.630; p=0.000 0.689; p=0.000 0.548; p=0.000 0.462; p=0.000 0.567; p=0.000 0.193; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(40); p value 1,938.7; p=0.000 299.9; p=0.000 1,197.9; p=0.000 781.2; p=0.000 1,281.2; p=0.000 1,427.5; p=0.000  641.5; p=0.000 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 
 
PANEL C: DEBT: IV 
FREQUENCY 
PROB. 
OF HAVING 
DEBT 
HIRE 
PURCHASE 
PERSONAL 
LOAN 
CREDIT CARD PRIVATE 
INDIVIDUAL 
OVERDRAFT OTHER DEBT 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Predicted frequency -0.128 5.34 -0.026 2.27 -0.036 2.15 -0.045 3.00 0.001 0.21 -0.020 2.18 -0.050 3.97 
ρ; p value 0.421; p=0.000 0.305; p=0.000 0.331; p=0.000 0.426; p=0.000 0.390; p=0.000 0.001; p=0.000 0.385; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(40); p value 1,198.0; p=0.000 409.2; p=0.000 880.9; p=0.000 756.2; p=0.000 87.6; p=0.000 998.1; p=0.000 674.9; p=0.000 
 
PANEL D: ASSET: IV 
FREQUENCY 
PROB. OF 
HAVING 
ASSETS 
NATIONAL 
SAVINGS 
PREMIUM 
BONDS 
UNIT TRUSTS PERSONAL 
EQUITY PLAN 
SHARES OTHER 
INVESTMENTS 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT 
Predicted frequency 0.007 0.44 0.001 0.54 -0.002 0.22 0.006 1.99 0.017 2.25 0.006 2.62 -0.001 0.29 
ρ; p value 0.545; p=0.000 0.765; p=0.000 0.731; p=0.000 0.614; p 0.472; p=0.000 0.597; p=0.000 0.352; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(40); p value 1,074.4; p=0.000 104.5; p=0.000 665.6; p=0.000 412.9; p=0.000 739.6; p=0.000 802.4; p=0.000 229.0; p=0.000 
OBSERVATIONS 19,191 
Notes: Additional control variables are as in Table 2; M.E. denotes marginal effect; standard errors are bootstrapped. 
 TABLE 7: Random Effects Analysis – Debt, Assets and Net Worth: Predicted Social Interaction 
 LOG UNSECURED 
DEBT (TOBIT) 
LOG FINANCIAL 
ASSETS (TOBIT) 
LOG NET 
WORTH 
LOG UNSECURED 
DEBT (TOBIT) 
LOG FINANCIAL 
ASSETS (TOBIT) 
LOG NET WORTH 
 M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT COEF TSTAT M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT COEF TSTAT 
Intercept -8.390 17.98 -21.26 21. 26 6.197 14.56 -8.181 14.58 -16.670 18.76 6.124 12.35 
Predicted club membership -0.412 3.70 0.917 5.27 0.190 1.05 – – – 
Predicted frequency – – – -1.353 5.49 -0.451 0.82 1.188 2.79 
ρ; p value 6.197; p=0.000 0.438; p=0.000 0.472; p=0.000 0.380; p=0.000 0.503; p=0.000 0.530; p=0.000 
Chi sq.(d); p value 2,709.9; p=0.000 2,368.2; p=0.000 3,592.0; p=0.000 1,941.0; p=0.000 1,678.4; p=0.000 2,595.8; p=0.000 
σ 6.187; p=0.000 7.046; p=0.000 – 6.288; p=0.000 6.752; p=0.000 – 
OBSERVATIONS 29,259 15,002 19,191 9,788 
Notes: Additional control variables are as in Table 5; M.E. denotes marginal effect; d=40 except for the net worth regressions where d=37; for the net worth specifications, the head of household is 
the unit of observation; standard errors are bootstrapped; the intercept is not scaled. 
. 
 
